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Fact Sheet: Securing U.S. Ports
Feb. 22, 2006
Direct link:
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=5437
The Administration has dramatically strengthened port security since 9/11.
Funding has increased by more than 700 percent since September 11, 2001.
Funding for port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001.
DHS spent approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005.
Following 9/11, the federal government has implemented a multi-layered
defense strategy to keep our ports safe and secure. New technologies have
been deployed with additional technologies being developed and $630 million
has been provided in grants to our largest ports, including $16.2 million to
Baltimore; $32.7 million to Miami; $27.4 million to New Orleans, $43.7
million to New York/New Jersey; and $15.8 million to Philadelphia.
Who Secures The Ports:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP's mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by
eliminating potential threats before they arrive at our borders and ports.
CBP uses intelligence and a risk-based strategy to screen information on 100
percent of cargo before it is loaded onto vessels destined for the United
States. All cargo that is identified as high risk is inspected, either at
the foreign port or upon arrival into the U.S.
Coast Guard: The Coast Guard routinely inspects and assesses the security of
U.S. ports in accordance with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act
and the Ports and Waterways Security Act. Every regulated U.S. port facility
is required to establish and implement a comprehensive security plan that
outlines procedures for controlling access to the facility, verifying
credentials of port workers, inspecting cargo for tampering, designating
security responsibilities, training, and reporting of all breaches of
security or suspicious activity, among other security measures. Working
closely with local port authorities and law enforcement agencies, the Coast
Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and inspects these plans and
facilities to ensure compliance.
Terminal Operator: Whether a person or a corporation, the terminal operator
is responsible for operating its particular terminal within the port. The
terminal operator is responsible for the area within the port that serves as
a loading, unloading, or transfer point for the cargo. This includes storage
and repair facilities and management offices. The cranes they use may be
their own, or they may lease them from the port authority.
Port Authority: An entity of a local, state or national government that
owns, manages and maintains the physical infrastructure of a port (seaport,
airport or bus terminal) to include wharf, docks, piers, transit sheds,
loading equipment and warehouses.
The role of the Port Authority is to facilitate and expand the movement of
cargo through the port, provide facilities and services that are
competitive, safe and commercially viable. The Port manages marine
navigation and safety issues within port boundaries and develops
marine-related businesses on the lands that it owns or manages.
A Layered Defense:
Screening and Inspection: CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo before it
arrives in the U.S. using intelligence and cutting edge technologies. CBP
inspects all high-risk cargo.
CSI (Container Security Initiative): Enables CBP, in working with host
government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized
cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined
for the United States. In addition to the current 42 foreign ports
participating in CSI, many more ports are in the planning stages. By the end
of 2006, the number is expected to grow to 50 ports, covering more than 80
percent of transpacific maritime containerized cargo shipped to the U.S.
24-Hour Rule: Under this requirement, manifest information must be provided
24 hours prior to the sea container being loaded onto the vessel in the
foreign port. CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel
is still overseas.
C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism): CBP created a
public-private and international partnership with over 5,800 businesses,
including most of the largest U.S. importers -- the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT, CBP and partner companies
are working together to improve baseline security standards for supply chain
and container security. (We check not only the company shipping the goods,
but also the companies that provided them with any services.)
Use of Cutting-Edge Technology: CBP is currently utilizing large-scale X-ray
and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo.
Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our nation's
ports, utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices to
examine cargo, and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection devices.
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $157 million to secure
next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry. Also, over 600
canine detection teams, who are capable of identifying narcotics, bulk
currency, human beings, explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons
are deployed at our ports of entry.
UAE/Dubai Ports World Acquisition
DP World will not, nor will any other terminal operator, control, operate or
manage any United States port. DP World will only operate and manage
specific, individual terminals located within six ports.
The recent business transaction taken by DP World, a United Arab Emirates
based company, to acquire British company Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company (P&O) does not change the operations or security of
keeping our nation's ports safe. The people working on the docks also will
not change as a result of this transaction.
This transaction is not an issue of controlling United States' ports. It is
an issue of operating some terminals within U.S. ports.
DP World will operate the following terminals within the six United States'
ports currently operated by the United Kingdom company, P & O:
o Baltimore - 2 of 14 total
o Philadelphia - 1 of 5 (does not include the 1 cruise vessel terminal)
o Miami - 1 of 3 (does not include the 7 cruise vessel terminals)
o New Orleans - 2 of 5 (does not include the numerous chemical plant
terminals up and down the Mississippi River, up to Baton Rouge)
o Houston - 4 of 12
o Newark - 1 of 4
o (Note: also in Norfolk - Involved with stevedoring activities at all 5
terminals, but not managing a specific terminal.)
P&O and DP World made a commitment to comply with current security programs,
regulations and partnerships to which P&O currently subscribes, including:
o The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT);
o The Container Security Initiative (CSI);
o The Business Alliance on Smuggling and Counterfeiting (BASC); and,
o The Megaports Initiative MOU with the Department of Energy.
All P&O security arrangements will remain intact, including cargo security
cooperation with CBP, compliance with USCG regulations (ISPS and MTSA)
regarding port facilities/terminals, and foreign terminal operations within
CSI ports.
Dubai was the first Middle Eastern entity to join the Container Security
Initiative (March 2005). As a result, CBP officers are working closely with
Dubai Customs to screen containers destined for the U.S. Cooperation with
Dubai officials has been outstanding and is a model for other operations
within CSI ports.
U.S. Recommended Standards for Container Security Initiative
The Container Security Initiative consists of four core elements. These are:
(1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2)
pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at
U.S. ports; (3) using technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers;
and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.
In order to be eligible to participate in CSI, the Member State's Customs
Administration and the seaport must meet the following three requirements:
The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating,
transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country.
Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray imaging
capabilities) and radiation detection equipment must be available and
utilized for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in
order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without
disrupting the flow of legitimate trade.
The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to
ports in the United States.
As part of agreeing to participate in CSI, a Member State's Customs
Administration and the seaport must also:
Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially
high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should include
a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and
identifying best practices.
Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management
information with the United States Customs Service in order to do
collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these
exchanges.
Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port's
infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities.
Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee
integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity.
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